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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

81-1629/21

9 October 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Assistant Director for Resources & Systems
Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Clearance Certifications of Department of Defense
Personnel Attending CIA Training Courses []

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REFERENCES: A. DIA/CIA Agreement, dated 19 March 1980; Subject:
Responsibilities and Administrative Procedures
Relating to CIA Conducted Training []
[] for Selected Department of Defense
Personnel []

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B. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
dated 8 June 1981; Subject: Degradation of
Operational Readiness/Mission Accomplishment Due
to Personnel Security/Investigative Shortfalls []

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1. The Security Annex of Reference A provides that individuals selected for training under the agreement must be "certified by DoD to hold Top Secret clearance based on a current investigation or updated investigation within a five-year period" prior to their nomination. It also provides that CIA Security Officers are to have access to DoD investigative reports on trainees. The objective of these provisions clearly was to ensure parity between the personnel security of DoD trainees and the CIA personnel with whom they would share access to sensitive intelligence sources and methods. []

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2. Reference B mandates a reduction of investigative coverage in background investigations and elimination of reinvestigations. I am concerned that this change in DoD security policy will have a negative impact upon the ability of DIA to fulfill the terms of Reference A. Top Secret clearances based upon the reduced standards of Reference B clearly will not be comparable to Top Secret clearances of CIA staff personnel, who continue to receive full investigative coverage, on both the initial background investigations and subsequent reinvestigations. []

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3. Since it is concluded that the reduced investigative coverage prescribed by Reference B does not meet the letter or intent of the Security Annex of Reference A, we will be unable to accept Top Secret certifications of DoD students based upon the reduced coverage. The sensitivity of some CIA training courses provided DoD students drives us to this decision.

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4. I would appreciate it if you would advise me whether we are correct in this conclusion or if Top Secret clearances of DoD trainees nominated for CIA courses will be based upon background investigations and reinvestigations consistent with the agreement. If this requirement cannot be met then we should discuss our next course of action. Your cooperation is solicited concerning this problem and will make it possible to continue the excellent relationship our agencies have enjoyed heretofore in this important training activity.

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Harry E. Fitzwater
Deputy Director
for
Administration

Rewritten:HEFitzwater:kmg (9 Oct 81)
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
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Personnel Attending CIA Training Courses

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ORIGINATOR:

Director of ~~Security~~

29 Sept. 1981
Date